Dating the enemy part 3

Ruses include the use of disguises, calling out in the language of the troops opposing them and feigning panic and disorganised withdrawal. 1 Platoon Commander the necessary number of men required during the construction of the positions. Distribution (disposition) of troops on the ocean-front as per attached map No. As resistance hardened, however, their attention to reconnaissance became once more evident and operations in Burma in particular show an intimate topographical knowledge which could only have been obtained by extensive patrolling and by the employment of local inhabitants as guides. The use of small patrols in a purely reconnaissance role has often been reported. Reconnaissance reports are frequently accompanied by sketches the general standard of which is high. The full weight of equipment carried will have been approximately 58 lbs.) 14. Without careful training this would hardly be possible, and troops are practised in overcoming such obstacles for weeks before they are committed to the actual operation. The following sites have been chosen in the past— area of a bridge upon which several routes converged, single road with dense jungle on both sides, centre of a town or village. Site.—Corner of a village under trees and behind a cactus hedge. 'Such tanks provide all round defence, water for the garrison, a ready made " communication trench " around the water's edge, and they are often rich in natural cover. The diagram below shows very clearly the outwards movement of defences. and area which have recently become more important to the Japanese. Their preparations for an attack of this nature are extremely thorough and in the case of Hong Kong may be said to have extended over a number of years.

This allows of the commanders to demonstrate their ability and the men to show their courage and ferocity in hand to hand fighting. " The English Army possesses mechanical mobility but lacks manoeuvrability therefore a quick deeisive battle should be sought by outflanking and encirclement." 1. There are, however, certain features of envelopment, as distinct from actual attack, which will have important bearing on any operations in which we are forced on the defensive, and these are discussed in the next Section. Section 5 is devoted to a study of the application to operations in the Arakan of the mobile warfare methods described in this Chapter. In the first Burma Campaign, from the time that the Japanese crossed the Salween River at Moulmein until the last action at Shwegyin on the Chindwin there are very few recorded instances of deliberate attacks. to hold which would cause us the maximum embarrassment and the focal point of the battle which ensued was often a road block. Reconnaissance.—Attacks are preceded by careful reconnaissance in which various ruses are employed in order to discover the location and extent of enemy localities.Their plans are a mixture of military artistry and vain-glorious audacity ". Rather was their superior mobility used to force us to attack troops who had succeeded in occupying a position behind us. Infact the Japanese fought defensively in country peculiarly suited to the defence. Trees are shaken in order to draw fire, defending troops are addressed in their own language in the hope that they will respond and small parties are used as bait for enemy fire." Deception, strategems and ruses must be expected at all times. One big exception to this method during the first Burma Campaign was an attack launched against one of our Brigades at Kyaukse ; here the Japanese suffered considerable losses and the attack failed completely. Finally if cover permits, scouts may be left in observation for long periods close to the enemy foremost defended localities. Methods of attach.—Attacks may take the form of single or double envelop ment or frontal assaults. The frontal attack.—Whilst in Malaya and Burma we have chiefly experienced the attack by envelopment, the Americans report that in the South West Pacific Area frontal attacks has often been made, particularly when an operation demanding more time might have given the defenders the opportunity to improve their positions.Training and the delegation to subordinates of the initiative for independent action are most probably the factors that make such tactics simple ". Approaches through country regarded as impassable and the conduct of operations during foul weather are means by which troops more sensitive to ground and climate have been placed at a disadvantage. With fifth column assistance it was possible to obtain up-to-date information on dispositions and defences and during mobile operations to direct aircraft onto headquarters and other suitable targets. During the early days of the war in the South West Pacific and Burma, the Japanese often subordinated reconnaissance to speed of advance; Frontal attacks were launched against imperfectly known positions and bold decisions were taken even where information was lacking. From about 0800 hrs do second attack and defence exercises and then-some sea bathing. Operations may be carefully rehearsed ; this does not mean that the Japanese train on a model of the position they will eventually attack, but rehearsals include intensive training under conditions closely approximating those under which they will be required to operate. Recently it has become apparent that the Japanese realize the importance of engaging aircraft early and are siting their guns in suitable positions to do this. Such counter-battery work in the Arakan has so far been inaccurate and therefore ineffective. In the absence of more detailed information it is safe to assume that Japanese methods will be similar to those employed by the Germans. The predominant considerations in an attack on a fortified position are surprise, preparation and concentration.The fifth column has been freely employed, and with their aid it has been possible greatly to increase the methods by which the enemy can be taken by surprise. 2 Platoon (all members except those on duty), and must quickly construct defensive positions as designated. 2 Platoon Commander will place under the direction of No. 1 and 2 Platoons (To each will be attached one quick-firing gun, one heavy machine gun, one light machine gun, one heavy grenade discharger) the first line. The initial offensive had succeeded and whatever the cost the momentum was to be maintained; the operations evolved themselves into one vast encounter battle in which the Japanese, having siezed the initiative sought to maintain it. A third report— " A full pack and three ammunition pouches were carried on all training " (This was in 1938. For example Japanese troops have achieved surprise more than once by advancing through what has been regarded as more or less impenetrable Mangrove swamp. The Japanese employ road blocks— to cut off a force retiring, to protect one or both flanks of an encircling movement, as part of a defensive system. As far as possible road blocks are sited in positions where they effectively prevent all movement until attacked and cleared; this is particularly the case in defence when they are most likely to be encountered on defile3 the possession of which is vital to an advancing force. G position was sited to cover a bridge, but the cactus hedge had been left undisturbed,, with the apparent intention of shooting the necessary gap in it only when necessary. Site.—-An ordinary water tank suoh as those found in Eastern India and Burma. They nevertheless appear to attach great importance to the possibility of low-flying and even air-landing attacks on airfields and this might account for their original aim of siting all guns ito cover the runway. Given sufficient data formation and unit headquarters are also engaged. The Japanese ability to achieve surprise extends to all forms of warfare and has already been discussed in Chapter I.

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